The idea of the third man is a purely Spanish identity.

How did Spain manage to dominate France yesterday as if it were a training session? Let’s see.

Spain knew that France pressed in a 4-4-2 formation, meaning they would only be facing two players in midfield. Therefore, Spain implemented a simple strategy in their build-up play, given their three midfielders!

The idea was for Rodri to position himself between the defensive duo of Kubarsi and Laporte.

The aim was to create a numerical advantage over Mbappé and Olsille, the first line of pressure, while Fabián Ruiz and Olmo stayed to draw out France’s midfield duo of Rabiot and Tchouaméni.

This meant that one player would be free to advance with the ball, and that player was one of the center-backs.

What happened next was to encourage Dembélé’s pressing on the right wing by keeping the ball at Laporte’s feet for longer.

Dembélé was then faced with a dilemma:

should he press the free-roaming Laporte or close down the passing lane to left-back Cucurella, since winger Baena had Koundé pinned back and couldn’t press Cucurella?

Spain, on the other hand, exploited their midfielders dropping deep to create a link with Laporte to deliver the ball to Cucurella.

In the first image, you’ll see Fabián Ruiz dropping deep and Rabiot drawing out the third man, Cucurella, who would advance with the ball.

In the second image, Olmo was performing the same role.

The result of this strategy was that Spain earned a penalty kick after Cucurella advanced with the ball unchallenged and sent in a cross that resulted in a mistake by Lucas Digne, leading to Spain’s victory.

Of course, Spain implemented other, more complex tactics, but the concept of the third man remains a distinctly Spanish identity that, to this day, no one has been able to stop or counter.

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